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 e aim of this paper is twofold.1 First, I am going to identify Isocrates’ three rhetorical 
principles, i.e., opportunity (kairos), suitability (to prepon) and novelty (kainos), as three 
pragmatic principles within the rhetorical system of his philosophy. Next, I am going to 
explain the signi#cance of opportunity and suitability, and discuss what Isocrates means 
by these terms. Prior to that, it is necessary to present the following premises. 
1. Isocrates never employed the word “rhetoric”2 to refer to his educational activity. 
He made frequently use of the expression “philosophia of the words”, although 
he also employed other terms in lieu of philosophia: education (paideia), practice 
(meletē) or dedication (epimeleia).
2.  e word “rhetoric” signi#ed just the “art of the rhētor”, and rhētor was a public 
orator, that is to say, a politician who spoke before the assembly or before the 
board of judges.
1  I am indebted to Debbie Sivertson, who reviewed the original text. 
2  Isocrates uses rhētoreia (‘oratory’, ‘oration’) and rhētoreuein (‘to be an orator’), cf. Schiappa 1999: 158–159.
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3. Plato labeled Isocrates’ profession as “rhetoric” so as to belittle the meaning 
and the #eld of his teaching. For Isocrates, the word “philosophy” did not signi-
fy “unsel#sh love for the truth” or anything of that sort, since this de#nition of 
the word was introduced only by Plato. For Isocrates, philosophy meant simply 
“skill” or “ability”,3 and his philosophy of rhetoric stood for the teaching-learning 
of speech ability. Consequently, whenever I use the phrase “Isocrates’ rhetoric”, 
I refer to Isocrates’ philosophy of rhetoric (i.e. rhetorical skill).
1. "e nature, teaching and practice of rhetoric
In his Antidosis, Isocrates says very clearly that to become a great orator, one needs three 
abilities (δυνάμεις) or competences, as I will translate the Greek word. Isocrates explains 
it in the following fundamental passage of the Antidosis (15.187):
I say to them that if they are to excel in oratory or in managing a<airs or in any line of work, they 
must, #rst of all, have a natural aptitude for that which they have elected to do; secondly, they 
must submit to training and master the knowledge of their particular subject, whatever it may 
be in each case; and, #nally, they must become versed and practiced in the use and application 
of their art; for only on these conditions can they become fully competent and pre-eminent in 
any line of endeavor (Norlin’s translation).
λέγομεν γὰρ ὡς δεῖ τοὺς μέQοντας διοίσειν ἢ περὶ τοὺς λόγους ἢ περὶ τὰς πράξεις ἢ περὶ τὰς 
ἄQας ἐργασίας πρῶτον μὲν πρὸς τοῦτο πεφυκέναι καλῶς, πρὸς ὃ ἂν προῃρημένοι τυγχάνωσιν, 
ἔπειτα παιδευθῆναι καὶ λαβεῖν τὴν ἐπιστήμην, ἥτις ἂν ᾗ περὶ ἑκάστου, τρίτον ἐντριβεῖς γενέσθαι 
καὶ γυμνασθῆναι περὶ τὴν χρείαν καὶ τὴν ἐμπειρίαν αὐτῶν ἐκ τούτων γὰρ ἐν ἁπάσαις ταῖς 
ἐργασίαις τελείους γίγνεσθαι καὶ πολὺ διαφέροντας τῶν ἄQων.4
 us, the #rst necessary condition is having a natural predisposition for oratory. I shall 
call it oratory competence. e second condition is carrying out an apt teaching-learning 
process. I shall call it rhetoric competence. Finally, the third condition is about the prac-
tice, which consists in applying the theory to various actual cases. I shall call it pragmatic 
competence. Rhetorical philosophy (or skill) is oriented to these three necessary and inter-
related capacities or competences. We can illustrate the concept of pragmatic competence 
by the following tentative table (the shaded part will be the focus of the present paper):
3  Pace Schiappa 1999: 168–184. We can understand Philosophy as a “political ability” (see Ramírez Vidal 
2016: 193–194).
4  See also Isoc. In soph. 13.14–15: αἱ μὲν γὰρ δυνάμεις καὶ τῶν λόγων καὶ τῶν ἄQων ἔργων ἁπάντων 
ἐν τοῖς εὐφυέσιν ἐίγνονται καὶ τοῖς περὶ τὰς ἐμπειρίας γεγυμνασμένοις· ἡ δὲ παίδευσις τοὺς μὲν τοιούτους 
τεχνικωτέρους, πρὸς τὸ ζητεῖν εὐπορωτέρους ἐποίησεν, “For ability, whether in speech or in any other activity, is 
found in those who are well endowed by nature and have been schooled by practical experience. Formal training 
makes such men more skilfull and more resourceful in discovering the possibilities of a subject” (Norlin’s trans-
lation). But see the translation of δυνάμεις by Mathieu, Brémond: “la faculté de faire des discurses”.
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Isocrates’ rhetorical philosophy
Competences (δυνάμεις)
Oratorical (φύσις) Rhetorical (τέχνη, 
ἐπιστήμη)
Pragmatic (μελέτη, 
ἐπιμέλειαν)
E
le
m
en
ts
 (
τὰ
 μ
ὲν
 ε
ἴδ
η 
τὰ
 τ
ῶ
ν 
λ
ό
γω
ν) εὑρεῖν ϰαὶ μαϑεῖν 
ϰαὶ πονῆσαι ϰαὶ 
μνημονεῦσαι [...] 
τὴν δὲ φωνὴν ϰαὶ 
τὴν τοῦ στόματος 
σαφήνειαν
[...] ἔτι δὲ 
τὴν τόλμαν 
[...] τὴν μετὰ 
σωφροσύνης 
(15.189–190)
κτλ.
τὸ δὲ δοϰεῖν εἶναι 
ϰαλὸν ϰἀγαϑὸν 
οὐ μόνον τὸν 
λόγον πιστότερον 
ἐποίησεν, (15.280)
συναρμόσαι ϰαὶ 
συναγαγεῖν, ϰαὶ 
οἰϰειῶσαι, ϰαὶ ποιῆ-
σαι σφίσιν αὐταῖς 
ὁμολογουμένας 
(15.11)
κτλ.
ἃς δεῖ προελέσθαι ϰαὶ μῖξαι 
πρὸς ἀQήλας ϰαὶ τάξαι ϰατὰ 
τρόπον
ἔτι δὲ τῶν καιρῶν μὴ 
διαμαρτεῖν
καὶ τοῖς ἐνθυμήμασι 
πρεπόντως ὅλον τὸν λόγον 
καταποικῖλαι
εὐρύθμως καὶ μουσικῶς 
εἰπεῖν (13.16) 
κτλ.
Sources: Isoc. In soph. 13.16–17; Antid. 15.11.183–185; 189–190; 276–282, etc.
2. Teaching and practice
For Isocrates, pragmatic competence (i.e., the practice or performance of actual 
discourse) was an indispensable branch of training the ideal orator. According to him, 
the natural capacity and practice were more important than the theory. us, a person 
trained in pragmatic competence can become even better than a person that has only 
the natural competence but has never bothered to put it into practice. It is obvious that 
an outstanding orator is a person that has both competences, natural and pragmatical.5 
5  Isoc. Antid. 15.191: καὶ μὲν δὴ κἀκείνους ἴσμεν, τοὺς καταδεεστέραν μὲν τούτων τὴν φύσιν ἔχοντας, ταῖς 
δʼ ἐμπειρίαις καὶ ταῖς ἐπιμελείαις προέχοντας, ὅτι γίγνονται κρείττους οὐ μόνον αὑτῶν ἀQὰ καὶ τῶν εὖ μὲν 
πεφυκότων λίαν δʼ αὑτῶν κατημεληκότων· ὥσθʼ ἑκάτερόν τε τούτων δεινὸν ἂν καὶ λέγειν καὶ πράττειν ποιήσειεν, 
ἀμφότερά τε γενόμενα περὶ τὸν αὐτὸν ἀνυπέρβλητον ἂν τοῖς ἄQοις ἀποτελέσειεν, “Again, we know that men 
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In any case, teaching rhetoric has a strong connection with its execution. e teacher’s 
activity can modify the natural skill by practicing the knowledge obtained during the 
instruction in such a way that the pragmatic and rhetorical competences are, in addition 
to the innate capacities of a person, two aspects of the potential orator’s development: 
“Whenever you desire to gain a thorough understanding of such things as it is #tting that 
kings should know, pursue them by practice as well as by study; for study will show you 
the way but training yourself in the actual doing of things will give you power to deal with 
a<airs”.6 e two aspects together make the learner a great orator, and in the Isocrates’ 
school of rhetoric both aspects were taught, in such a way that practice was nothing else 
than exercises given by the teacher.
3. Principles of pragmatic competence
Nevertheless, the rhetorical theory looks at an ideal orator as someone who is in ideal circum-
stances and before ideal audience. us, the rhetorical theory is genuinely ideal and abstract, 
and behaves like grammatical study: it makes all circumstantial aspects equal and is focused 
on studying the elements contained and the connections between these. e speaker can 
express himself in a very clever way without theoretical knowledge of rhetoric, while the 
learner might still face several diÀculties in skillfully applying his theoretical knowledge. In 
his school, Isocrates tried to solve these problems by doing exercises with observations and 
councils. e importance of this part of the training cannot be underestimated.
According to Isocrates’ testimony (In soph. 13.12–13), the rhetoric’s contemporary 
teachers trained their students in their doctrines as if rhetoric were a #xed technical 
discipline, whereas for Isocrates rhetorical philosophy was a creative activity. A #xed 
technique is analogous to using letters which form a word: the letters do not change and 
we always utilize the same ones to make reference to a same object – we cannot use the 
same words, though, because the issues are always di<erent.7 We could say that speech 
who are less generously endowed by nature but excel in experience and practice, not only improve upon them-
selves, but surpass others who, though highly giÂed, have been too negligent of their talents. It follows, therefore, 
that either one of these factors may produce an able speaker or an able man of a<airs, but both of them combined 
in the same person might produce a man incomparable among his fellows” (Norlin’s translation).
6  Isoc. Ad Nic. 2.35: ὅ τι ἂν ἀϰριβῶσαι βουληϑῇς ὧν ἐπίστασϑαι προσήϰει τοὺς βασιλεῖς, ἐμπειρίᾳ μέτιϑι 
ϰαὶ φιλοσοφίᾳ· τὸ μὲν γὰρ φιλοσοφεῖν τὰς ὁδούς σοι δείξει, τὸ δ᾽ ἐπ᾽ αὐτῶν τῶν ἔργων γυμνάζεσϑαι δύνασϑαί 
σε χρῆσϑαι τοῖς πράγμασι ποιήσει (Norlin’s translation).
7  Isoc. In soph. 13.12: θαυμάζω δʼ ὅταν ἴδω τούτους μαθητῶν ἀξιουμένους, οἳ ποιητικοῦ πράγματος 
τεταγμένην τέχνην παράδειγμα φέροντες λελήθασι σφᾶς αὐτούς. τίς γὰρ οὐκ οἶδε πλὴν τούτων ὅτι τὸ μὲν τῶν 
γραμμάτων ἀκινήτως ἔχει καὶ μένει κατὰ ταὐτόν, ὥστε τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἀεὶ περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν χρώμενοι διατελοῦμεν, τὸ 
δὲ τῶν λόγων πᾶν τοὐναντίον πέπονθεν· τὸ γὰρ ὑφʼ ἑτέρου ῥηθὲν τῷ λέγοντι μετʼ ἐκεῖνον οὐχ ὁμοίως χρήσιμόν 
ἐστιν, ἀQʼ οὗτος εἶναι δοκεῖ τεχνικώτατος, ὅς τις ἂν ἀξίως μὲν λέγῃ τῶν πραγμάτων, μηδὲν δὲ τῶν αὐτῶν τοῖς 
ἄQοις εὑρίσκειν δύνηται, “But I marvel when I observe these men setting themselves up as instructors of youth 
who cannot see that they are applying the analogy of an art with hard and fast rules to a creative process. For, 
excepting these teachers, who does not know that the art of using letters remains #xed and unchanged, so that 
we continually and invariably use the same letters for the same purposes, while exactly the reverse is true of the 
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is exceptional, unique, distinct, diverse and singular. en, contemporary teachers could 
#x the same words to be uttered by one speaker or another, as if words were letters, but 
this would be wrong, because what is helpful for one person is not necessarily helpful for 
another.8
In this way, the best art or techne consists in speaking about the issues in question 
appropriately, that is to say, the words have to be used in accordance with the signi#cance 
of the case: the orator has to speak in conformity with the importance of the matter. e 
di<erence between letters and words lies in that, in contrast to letters, a word is correctly 
said, when the opportunities (kairoí), suitability or adequacy (to prepon) and novelty (to 
kainos) are taken into account. Hence, apart from the mere technique of speaking, i.e., 
apart from the sheer theoretical scheme that is to be taught and learned, the rhetor must 
see the use of language in a lively and practical way. 
 e teacher refers to a twofold language articulation. On the one hand, letters (that is 
to say, sounds) create words. On the other hand, words make speech. ere is an import-
ant di<erence, though, since words are #xed, because they are employed for the same 
things. Speech, on the other hand, does not have this character. It is always necessary to 
consider the opportunities, the junctures for uttering speech; it is also necessary to adjust 
the word to the issue and speech in a novel way. 
In the same speech (In soph. 13.16), Isocrates says that it is not diÀcult to know the 
devices which allow one to utter and compose any speech if the student is in the hands 
of a serious master, and not in the hands of some trickster. However, it is very diÀcult 
to learn how to apply the technical elements (eidē) to particular cases, as the elements 
that one has to choose, combine with each other and arrange according to the tropos or 
kind of issues. Furthermore, Isocrates adds, the speaker cannot make mistakes about the 
opportunities: it is necessary to garnish the speech with good ideas in an opportune way 
and to express oneself using words rhythmically and musically. e student needs to have 
the natural qualities and a competent teacher in order to achieve this. 
Other similar passages allow us to understand the lasting importance of these theo-
ries. In the Panegyricus, the author also suggest that all orators have the possibility to use 
the rhetorical elements for persuading, but only the most intelligent people (Panegyr. 4.9: 
εὖ φρονούντων) are capable of handling them at an opportune moment, reÍecting on 
the expedients which are convenient in each particular situation and arranging them in 
words in a speech.9 ese are the same principles of opportunity, suitability and novel-
art of discourse? For what has been said by one speaker is not equally useful for the speaker who comes aÂer him; 
on the contrary, he is accounted most skilled in this art who speaks in a manner worthy of his subject and yet is 
able to discover in it topics which are nowise the same as those used by others” (Norlin’s translation).
8  Cf. Too 1995: 191: “a student will have to rivise and adapt the identity provided by his paradigm to his 
particular needs at any moment: he cannot take his teacher to be a rigidly prescriptive model for rhetorical 
action”.
9  Isoc. Panegyr. 4.9: αἱ μὲν γὰρ πράξεις αἱ προγεγενημέναι κοιναὶ πᾶσιν ἡμῖν κατελείφθησαν, τὸ δʼ ἐν καιρῷ 
ταύταις καταχρήσασθαι καὶ τὰ προσήκοντα περὶ ἑκάστης ἐνθυμηθῆναι καὶ τοῖς ὀνόμασιν εὖ διαθέσθαι τῶν εὖ 
φρονούντων ἴδιόν ἐστιν, “For the deeds of the past are, indeed, an inheritance common to us all; but the ability 
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ty. In the Panathenaicus, Isocrates refuses techniques (artes), knowledge and natural 
giÂs, and believes that the best prepared pupil is the one that can deal with issues which 
happen daily, the one that has an adequate opinion about the opportunities and the one 
that has the ability to above all appreciate utility.10 us, when his life came to an end, 
Isocrates recognized ethical issues to be more important than rhetoric itself in the strict-
est sense of the word. But Isocrates’ teaching is rhetorical philosophy, teaching the skillful 
use of words related to the traditional norms, prudence and common sense.
On the basis of these passages, we realize that Isocrates considered rhetoric as 
a creative process, while the rules that have to be learned could not be #xed. For this 
reason, it is necessary for an orator to adapt his words to the issue and choose, combine 
and order the elements of the art according to the issue. Moreover, the same orator should 
pay attention to the opportunities, express himself in an adequate and novel way, and 
employ rhythmical and musical words.
To sum up: pragmatic competence is a perquisite for becoming an expert orator in 
Isocrates’ rhetorical philosophy, while the fundamental principles of this theory are: 
a) the suitability of the rhetorical elements for the particular issue; b) the opportunity 
(kairos); c) the suitability of the contents (to prepon) and d) the rhythm as well as music 
in the expression. Each one of these principles can be seen in a speci#c way.
4. Opportunity (kairos)
Kairos or opportunity is a principle of rhetoric.11 Scienti#c knowledge does not have 
access to it. Isocrates states that “no system of knowledge can possibly cover these occa-
sions, since in all cases they elude our science. Yet those who most apply their minds to 
them and are able to discern the consequences which for the most part grow out of them, 
will most oÂen meet these occasions in the right way”.12 Consequently, the relation of the 
to make proper use of them at the appropriate time, to conceive the right sentiments about them in each instance, 
and to set them forth in #nished phrase, is the peculiar giÂ of the wise” (Norlin’s translation).
10  Isoc. Panath. 12.30: πρῶτον μὲν τοὺς καλῶς χρωμένους τοῖς πράγμασι τοῖς κατὰ τὴν ἡμέραν ἑκάστην 
προσπίπτουσι, καὶ τὴν δόξαν ἐπιτυχῆ τῶν καιρῶν ἔχοντας καὶ δυναμένην ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ στοχάζεσθαι τοῦ 
συμφέροντος, “First, those who manage well the circumstances which they encounter day by day, and who 
possess a judgement which is accurate in meeting occasions as they arise and rarely misses the expedient course 
of action” (Norlin’s translation).
11  On the importance of kairós, see Sipiora, Baumlin 2002: 7–14. E.g. “What may be Isocrates’ most import-
ant historical contribution, however, is his articulation of the critical importance of kairos in rhetorical theory 
and practice. (…) Much of Isocrates’ success over nearly two millennia may be attributed to his formal system of 
rhetorical paideia, structured on the principle of kairos”.
12  Isoc. Antid. 15.184: τῷ μὲν γὰρ εἰδέναι περιλαβεῖν αὐτοὺς οὐχ οἷόν τʼ ἐστίν· ἐπὶ γὰρ ἁπάντων τῶν 
πραγμάτων διαφεύγουσι τὰς ἐπιστήμας, οἱ δὲ μάλιστα προσέχοντες τὸν νοῦν καὶ δυνάμενοι θεωρεῖν τὸ 
συμβαῖνον ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ πλειστάκις αὐτῶν τυγχάνουσι (Norlin’s translation). Cf. Too 1995: 182–183: “the 
doxastic method is an empirical one: it lies in anticipating the kairoi from the indications which generally accom-
pany them”.
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suppositions or opinions (doxai) about occasions depends on the prudence or practical 
intelligence (phronēsis) and experience;13 it is never a reliable or systematic knowledge. 
Although the master does not have any science for making an orator out of just any person, 
he can contribute in some way, and this Isocratic idea is expounded in his speeches.14
On the other hand, it is important to note that the principle of opportunity (kairos) 
relates not only to man’s words, but to his actions as well. This is a prudential educa-
tion: when to act and when to remain quiet (see Too 1995: 177). When the circumstances 
are unfavorable, one has wait for the opportunity to act with the intention of becoming 
successful every time, even if one is weak. 
 ere are some actions that depend on the practical intelligence (phronēsis), but not 
on the technique. We have already said that only a prudent man can pro#t from the past 
acts at opportune moment. Prudence makes one see how pro#table the juncture is. Yet 
prudence is not an art, but rather a practice and routine. Consequently, one could think 
that prudence is not teachable and that opportunities cannot be learned, either. However, 
according to Isocrates, prudence is to be transmitted by practical advice about how to 
behave in di<erent walks of life.
In Isocrates’ rhetorical philosophy it is very important to choose the occasion. Indeed, 
the disciples do exercises on how to judge if the speech has been written according to the 
occasion and in an accurate style (cf. In Phil. 5.155). If a man wants to persuade, he cannot 
speak inaccurately, he has to speak when it is convenient and in a suitable way. is condi-
tion for a successful speech is also valid for actions. One must not wage war unless there 
is certainty and guarantee of success (Panegyr. 4.160). In adequate circumstances, even 
weak forces can tip the balance in favor of one of the armed forces in a battle (Panegyr. 
4.139). us, actions and words are to be made at an opportune moment.
Knowledge of favorable moments is complemented with understanding of unfavor-
able times. us, εὐκαιρία or “opportunity” is in opposition to ἀκαιρία or “tactlessness”. 
In his work Ad Dem. 1.31–32, Isocrates reÍects:
[...] you must avoid being serious when the occasion is one for mirth, or taking pleasure in 
mirth when the occasion is serious (for what is unseasonable is always o<ensive); you must not 
bestow your favors ungraciously as do the majority who, when they must oblige their friends, 
do it o<ensively; and you must not be given to fault-#nding, which is irksome, nor be censo-
rious, which is exasperating. If possible avoid drinking-parties altogether, but if ever occasion 
13  See Matson 1957: 425: “Doxa is not irresponsible guessing, but insight based on experience: worldly 
wisdom, which education can develop where native wit is not lacking”. Sipiora, Baumlin 2002: 9: “Phronesis, 
coupled with kairos, is integral to e<ective rhetoric”.
14  Phronēsis is a characteristic of the well-educated and virtuous man and has the highest value in Isocrates. 
See Panath. 12.31–32, cf. Pouloakos, Depew 2004: 56–57, passim. Schwarze 1999: 93: “But its meaning is wider: 
the chief problem of rhetoric does not lie in negotion the alleged distintion between appearance and reality; 
rather, it lies in generation appearances that will be useful for the community”, etc.
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arises when you must be present, rise and take your leave before you become intoxicated; for 
when the mind is impaired by wine it is like chariots which have lost their drivers [...].15 
It is noteworthy that there is a certain link between Isocrates’ doctrine and pragmat-
ic theories, as according to modern studies communicative competence is a capability 
to know when to speak and when to remain silent as well as in relation to what things, 
whom, when, where and how.16 Isocrates gives rules for speaking and remaining silent. 
Let us mention some Isocratic rules. For example, in his Panegyricus 4.5, he says “for then, 
and only then, should we cease to speak, when the conditions have come to an end and 
there is no longer any need to deliberate about them, or when we see that the discussion 
of them is so complete that there is leÂ to others no room to improve upon what has been 
said”.17 Conversely, we should continue speaking when the conjuncture continues being 
favorable and the problem has not been solved or when nothing is necessary to add.
In his Ad Demonicus 1.41, Isocrates states: “Let there be but two occasions for speech – 
when the subject is one which you thoroughly know and when it is one on which you 
are compelled to speak. On these occasions alone is speech better than silence; on all 
others, it is better to be silent than to speak”.18 e #rst we could denominate a “rule of 
authority” and the second a “rule of necessity”, as it can occur, for example, when a man 
is taken before the court or when the slave is taken to be tortured. Even though he does 
not know, he must speak. 
5. Suitability (to prepon)
To prepon is another principle of pragmatic competence in Isocrates’ rhetoric. In this case, 
there exists a greater uncertainty than in the others and although the word to prepon is 
rarely used (in comparison with kairos), Isocrates also resorts to others, like ἁρμόττειν, 
i.e., “to assemble”, “to connect”, from which ἁρμονία comes (a word that never appears 
in Isocrates). Anyway, the concept is important. On this, Kinneavy 2002: 59, writes: “it 
is not inaccurate to say that kairos, with the related concept of prepon, was a major issue 
15  Isoc. Ad Dem. 1.31–32: μηδὲ παρὰ τὰ γελοῖα σπουδάζων, μηδὲ παρὰ τὰ σπουδαῖα τοῖς γελοίοις 
χαίρων (τὸ γὰρ ἄκαιρον πανταχοῦ λυπηρόν)· μηδὲ τὰς χάριτας ἀχαρίστως χαριζόμενος, ὅπερ πάσχουσιν οἱ 
ποQοί, ποιοῦντες μέν, ἀηδῶς δὲ τοῖς φίλοις ὑπουργοῦντες· μηδὲ φιλαίτιος ὤν, βαρὺ γάρ, μηδὲ φιλεπιτιμητής, 
παροξυντικὸν γάρ. μάλιστα μὲν εὐλαβοῦ τὰς ἐν τοῖς πότοις συνουσίας· ἐὰν δέ ποτέ σοι συμπέσῃ καιρός, 
ἐξανίστασο πρὸ μέθης. ὅταν γὰρ ὁ νοῦς ὑπὸ οἴνου διαφθαρῇ, ταὐτὰ πάσχει τοῖς ἅρμασι τοῖς τοὺς ἡνιόχους 
ἀποβαλοῦσιν (Norlin’s translation). See other Isocrates’ passages on kairós, and his analysis in Baumlim 2002.
16  Hymes, apud M. Bertuccelli Pappi 2000: 77.
17  Isoc. Panegyr. 4.5: τότε γὰρ χρὴ παύεσθαι λέγοντας, ὅταν ἢ τὰ πράγματα λάβῃ τέλος καὶ μηκέτι δέῃ 
βουλεύεσθαι περὶ αὐτῶν, ἢ τὸν λόγον ἴδῃ τις ἔχοντα πέρας, ὥστε μηδεμίαν λελεῖφθαι τοῖς ἄQοις ὑπερβολήν 
(Norlin’s translation).
18  Isoc. Ad Dem. 1.41: δύο ποιοῦ καιροὺς τοῦ λέγειν, ἢ περὶ ὧν οἶσθα σαφῶς, ἢ περὶ ὧν ἀναγκαῖον εἰπεῖν. ἐν 
τούτοις γὰρ μόνοις ὁ λόγος τῆς σιγῆς κρείττων, ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἄQοις ἄμεινον σιγᾶν ἢ λέγειν (Norlin’s translation). 
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in much of classical rhetoric in antiquity [...]”. An example of a use of this concept occurs 
when the orator advises Nicocles to be urbane and solemn: one adapts well to tyranny; 
the other to one’s companions.19 
Still, sometimes there seems to be a certain confusion between the opportune 
moment and suitability. But, even though there are cases in which both terms are identi-
cal or complementary, in general there is a di<erentiation. e criterion of opportunity is 
based on external conditions. e Persian king waits for the juncture to attack, knowing 
he is weak. e criterion of suitability, on the other hand, has to do with the actual possi-
bilities that the orator has to adapt himself to, the context, the subject and the addressee. 
In the #rst case, in e<ect, one expects the orator to behave in a certain way. e tyrant 
must be solemn; an equal one must be urbane. Also, in the speech Ad Demonicus 1.15, 
Isocrates shows the behavior that a young nobleman like his addressee has to display. 
Certain words are adapted to young people; others to more mature people (cf. Ad Dem. 
1.44). is aspect is very frequent in Isocrates’ works. 
But Isocrates did not limit the suitability of words or actions to the orator himself, but 
also employed it to the subject. is happens, for example, in the Antidosis 15.10, where 
the author aÀrms: “[...] while some things in my discourse are appropriate [preponta] 
to be spoken in a court-room, others are out of place amid such controversies, being 
frank discussions about philosophy and expositions of its power”.20 is use is particu-
larly important because it has to do with the theory of the genres. A judicial speech is not 
the same as a political speech. is may seem quite elementary, but without a doubt it is 
essential within a broader exhibition of the elements for the practice of rhetoric. 
It is crucial to point out that behavior oÂen occurs spontaneously, without it being 
the orator’s intention, but sometimes it can also occur consciously, when we behave 
in a certain way with the intention of persuading. us, in his Epistle to the children of 
Jason 7, Isocrates advises his readers not to be astonished if he repeats things he said 
before, because, although sometimes he does it without realizing, other times he does it 
consciously, when it seems to him appropriate [prepon] for the subject.21
Isocrates is certainly a traditionalist and supports de#ned rules of conduct. But he 
also sees it all from the perspective of e<ective words and clever actions, because, as he 
19  Isoc. Ad Nic. 2.52: χρὴ τοίνυν ἀφέμενον τῶν ἀμφισβητουμένων ἐπὶ τοῦ συνομολογουμένου λαμβάνειν 
αὐτῶν τὸν ἔλεγχον, καὶ μάλιστα μὲν ἐπὶ τῶν καιρῶν θεωρεῖν συμβουλεύοντας, εἰ δὲ μή, καὶ καθʼ ὅλων τῶν 
πραγμάτων λέγοντας. καὶ τοὺς μὲν μηδὲν γιγνώσκοντας τῶν δεόντων ἀποδοκίμαζε, “You should, therefore, 
avoid what is in controversy and test men’s value in the light of what is generally agreed upon, if possible taking 
careful note of them when they present their views on particular situations; or, if that is not possible, when 
they discuss general questions. And when they are altogether lacking in what they ought to know, reject them” 
(Norlin’s translation).
20  Isoc. Antid. 15.10: ἔστι γὰρ τῶν γεγραμμένων ἔνια μὲν ἐν δικαστηρίῳ πρέποντα ῥηθῆναι, τὰ δὲ πρὸς μὲν 
τοὺς τοιούτους ἀγῶνας οὐχ ἁρμόττοντα, περὶ δὲ φιλοσοφίας πεπαρρησιασμένα καὶ δεδηλωκότα τὴν δύναμιν 
αὐτῆς (Norlin’s translation).
21  Isoc. Ep. 6.7: μὴ θαυμάζετε δ᾽ ἄν τι φαίνωμαι λέγων ὧν πρότερον ἀκηκόατε: τῷ μὲν γὰρ ἴσως ἄκων ἂν 
ἐντύχοιμι, τὸ δὲ καὶ προειδώς, εἰ πρέπον εἰς τὸν λόγον εἴη, προσλάβοιμι, “Do not be amazed if you #nd me saying 
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states in the aforementioned passage of his In soph. 13.13: rhetorical e<ectiveness also 
depends on the suitability of the words. 
Conclusions 
I have limited myself to presenting, in a general way, two elements of Isocrates’ rhetori-
cal system, which have to be further studied in greater depth. Nevertheless, one should 
be careful when studying these aspects. e only aspect that we can understand with 
certain clarity is the rhetorical competence, the technical elements that take place during 
the speech generating-process. However, according to Isocrates himself, the most diÀ-
cult thing is to know how to put discourse into practice; the pragmatic mechanisms that 
make a speech e<ective cannot be the object of a discipline. Pragmatic competence is 
based on practice, on continuous exercises under the direction of a teacher with experi-
ence. Only in this way can phrónēsis, the practical intelligence of the orator, be acquired. 
Also, we are unable to modify our natural oratorical capacities. Nevertheless, between 
a natural oratorical capacity and practical knowledge there is a signi#cant di<erence, 
because while it is not possible to inÍuence in the former, it is possible to inÍuence in 
pragmatic competence. e importance of Isocrates in this #eld is enormous, because 
he faces this problem and presents a solution not only to understand how we must speak 
successfully, but also how we must act successfully in our community. Unfortunately, 
both terms did not have a special signi#cance in later rhetoric, apart from Cicero, who 
fused both concepts in the Latin word decorum. But their importance in Isocrates and 
in ancient Greek rhetoric justi#es calling attention to both and considering them when 
analyzing and performing discourses.
something you have heard before; in some cases, I might do this unwittingly, while in others, I do so intentionally 
if it is appropriate for the argument” (Papillon’s translation).
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Pragmatic Rhetorical Principles in Isocrates
While Isocrates regarded rhetoric not as a rigid discipline, but as a crea-
tive and pliable art, it is not possible to standardize art. According to 
his point of view (Against the sophists 13.13), good speech depends 
on certain principles: opportunity (kairos); suitability (to prepon) and 
novelty (kainos). e sophists, according to Isocrates, did not pay atten-
tion to these principles, and that was their main mistake. e problem 
was, however, that it was diÀcult to teach these principles to the disci-
ples, precisely because rhetoric was a Íexible art. Still, although it is 
not possible to provide #xed rules concerning rhetorical principles, the 
ancient rhetor provided some useful suggestions in his works which 
make it possible to reconstruct the nature of these principles.
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